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Introduction
There are at least two motives for investigating the relationship between information sharing and financial sector development in Africa: (i) introduction of hitherto unexplored notions of financial informalization, financial formalization and financial non-formalization in the financial sector development literature 1 and (ii) gaps in the information asymmetry literature.
Recent literature accords with the view that access to finance in the continent has been constrained by issues of surplus liquidity (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; . It is in response to this policy syndrome that over the past twelve years, information sharing bureaus have been introduced to reduce concerns of moral hazard and adverse selection in the financial industry (see Triki & Gajigo, 2014) . In essence, information sharing bureaus with instruments of private credit bureaus and public credit registries have been introduced to reduce information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders in order to ease constraints in access to finance 2 . Public credit registries and private credit bureaus are institutions that collect positive (e.g. repayment behaviour) and negative (e.g. default rates) information on borrowers'
obligations. The six distinctive features (in terms of access, data sources used, ownership, status, coverage and purpose) between public credit registries and private credit bureaus are discussed in the data section. As documented by Batuo and Kupukile (2010) and Allen et al. (2011) , the policies motivating the initiation of information sharing bureaus have built on the evidence that lending by banks is limited by a number of factors that are indirectly or directly connected to the underlying information asymmetry, namely: eligibility to bank lending, physical access and affordability.
Information sharing bureaus are theoretically expected to serve as brokers in banking intermediation. Moreover, by sharing information, information sharing bureaus enable inter alia: efficient allocation of capital; reduce constraints in credit and increase interbank competition (see Jappelli & Pagano, 2002) . This study is more concerned with the role of information sharing bureaus in financial sector development. Unfortunately, recent African literature on information 4 asymmetry has concluded that information sharing bureaus may not be stimulating inter-bank competition for enhanced credit access (Asongu et al., 2015) . The authors have further emphasised that is it possible that instead of using information from information sharing bureaus to improve financial access, because of lack of competition, financial institutions have been using information sharing bureaus to enjoy a 'quiet life' 3 .
The literature on information asymmetry related to broad and African-specific studies has not engaged the dimension of financial sector development (Ivashina, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Tanjung et al., 2010) . A reason for this missing link may be that data on information sharing bureaus is not available before 2004. Moreover, from the perspective of interbank competition, according to O'Toole (2014) and Asongu (2015a) , a great chunk of studies has been limited to aspects of banking institutions like bank concentration and bank participation. We deviate from this stream of the literature by engaging financial sector development in the perspective of financialization. Accordingly, while a substantial bulk of studies has investigated the incidence of financial reforms on financial access (Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010) , this study presents a case for the imperative of introducing the previously missing informal financial sector into the conception and definition of the financial system on the one hand and the notion of financialization on the other hand.
By introducing the notion of financial sector financialization (which are proposed and discussed in Section 2), the inquiry unites two streams of research by simultaneously contributing to the macroeconomic literature on the measurement of financial development and responding to an evolving field of economic development through informal finance and microfinance. Furthermore, the study suggests a practical way of disentangling the impact of information sharing on various financial sectors. Accordingly, the empirical exercise introduces hitherto unexplored concepts of financial sector non-formalization, informalization, semiformalization and formalization.
Consistent with , in spite of the acute concerns about financial access in Africa, the literature on information sharing has not given the continent the scholarly attention it deserves. According to the narrative, the limited scholarly focus on the continent has been 5 restricted in scope because very limited and selected countries have been engaged. Some studies have included: no African country (Galindo & Miller, 2001) ; four nations (Love & Mylenko, 2003) and nine countries (Barth et al., 2009 ). Triki and Gajigo (2014) and private credit bureaus in the measurement of information sharing are closest to the present inquiry. Unfortunately, these studies have focused on financial access and not on financial sector development. Our extension is also motivated by recommendations for more research on the incidence of information sharing bureaus (Singh et al., 2009, p. 13) .
In order to address the research gap, we use Ordinary Least Squares and the Generalised show that information sharing bureaus increase (reduce) formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development and increasing information sharing bureaus leads to negative (positive) net effects on formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development. We determine policy thresholds at which such counterintuitive effects can be avoided. The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings, propositions and related literature. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. Empirical results and policy implications are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and suggests future research directions.
Background, theoretical underpinnings, propositions and related literature

Background
Information sharing bureaus also known as 'credit reference agencies' refer to institutions that collect information on an individual or commercial borrowers' obligations from multiple sources, namely: retails lenders, credit card companies and banks (for individuals) and supplies, direct investigation and public sources (for businesses). Upon data collection, the information is merged for a comprehensive credit report after cross-checking. The report can then be used by future creditors. Information from a credit history report can entail both negative and positive information: (i) negative information (or information on defaults for the most part) and (ii) positive information (consisting of details on all closed and opened credit amounts, closed credit accounts and repayment behaviour). 
Theoretical underpinnings and propositions
There are two dominants views on the theoretical nexus between the sharing of information and financial development (see Claus & Grimes, 2003) . Whereas the first focuses on the transformation of bank assets' risk features, the second is concerned with the mechanisms by 7 which liquidity provided by banks can be boosted. In addition, the two streams in the literature are in accordance with the perspective that the core mission of banks is to enhance financial access through reduction of cost and optimal channelling of financial resources from banks to economic operators. The highlighted streams are consistent with foremost literature on the importance of reducing information asymmetry for financial intermediary allocation efficiency, notably, on: ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetry (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) ;
communication by banks to investors on potential borrowers (Leland & Pyle, 1977) ; diversification with financial intermediaries (Diamond, 1984) and credit rationing models (Jaffee & Russell, 1976; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Williamson, 1986) .
More contemporary literature suggests that information sharing bureaus are theoretically expected to boost financial access by improving financial sector development (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2015) . We measure financial sector development by addressing some shortcomings in the appreciation of financial development. In essence, the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2008) definition of the financial system has failed to incorporate the informal financial sector (Asongu, 2014a) .
The propositions in Table 1 which incorporate the informal financial sector into the financial system definition are being increasingly employed in the financial sector development literature (see Asongu, 2015ab ). Whereas Panel A shows indicators of financial sector based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the measurements of Panel B are linked to competition for shares in money supply in the financial sector. The financial sector development concept builds on the notions of informalization, formalization, non-formalization and semi-formalization. For example, financial informalization is the progress of the informal financial sector at the expense of the formal and semi-formal financial sectors whereas financial formalization is the growth of the formal financial sector to the detriment of the other financial sectors (semi-formal and informal). The concept of 'financial sector development' is based on shares in money supply.
Within this framework, one financial sector improves to the detriment of other sectors by increasing the quantity of money supply circulating within its sector. It is interesting to note that the non-formal financial sector includes the informal and semi-formal financial sectors. (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432) . 8 "This indicator measures the rate at which the semi-formal financial sector is evolving at the expense of formal and informal sectors" (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432) . 9 "This proposition appreciates the degree by which the informal financial sector is developing to the detriment of formal and semi-formal sectors" (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432 (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432) .
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Emphasis on the informal financial sector is important because of the substantially documented neglect of this sector in the financial development literature (Aryeetey, 2005; Adeusi et al., 2012; Meagher, 2013) . The propositions challenge mainstream narrative in three key areas, namely: (i) disentanglement of the existing financial system definition into its semi formal and formal components; (ii) a definition of the financial system that incorporates the informal financial sector and (iii) introduction of the concept of financialization within the framework of financial sector development.
Related literature
In accordance with recent information sharing literature (Asongu et al., 2015 , empirical studies have been oriented for the most part towards: the incidence of information sharing among creditors on the one hand and the effects of creditors' rights on improved mechanisms of sharing information. In essence, one strand has been mainly concerned with the relevance of stronger creditors' rights in: bankruptcy (Claessens & Klapper, 2005; Djankov et al., 2007; Brockman & Unlu, 2009 ) and risk-taking by banks (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011) . The other strand is focused on investigating how mitigating asymmetric information could inter alia: boost financial access (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009; Asongu, 2015; Triki & Gajigo, 2014) ; mitigate rates of defaults (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002) ; influence syndicated bank loans (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010) ; reduce the cost of credit (Brown et al., 2009) ; influence corrupt-related lending (Barth et al., 2009 ) and affect antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012) .
Noticeably, the highlighted literature has been focused on developed and developing nations where concerns about surplus liquidity are not so severe, for the most part. In essence, while most of the literature has been oriented towards the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development countries and developing nations in Asia and Latin America, the African continent has not received the scholarly attentions it deserves because it comparatively has more severe concerns of financial access, due to information asymmetry (Asongu et al., 2015) .
A macroeconomic perspective of the concern about information sharing has been engaged by Galindo and Miller (2001) who have concluded that compared to less developed nations, developed countries with information sharing bureaus are endowed with less restrictions to financial access. In essence, private credit registries that are performing contribute considerably to the decreasing sensitivity by corporations to decisions on investment for 'cash flows availability' which is a proxy of financial constraint. The authors have also established that credit registries have experienced a 50% reduction in performance, notably: as concerns how investment decisions are sensitive to internal funds.
A combination of private and public credit registries and corporation-related data from the World Bank Business Environment Survey has been used by Love and Mylenko (2000) to investigate two principal issues, notably whether: owing to reduced information asymmetry between perception managers and banks, credit registries are negatively associated with financial credit constraints. The authors conclude that whereas public credit registries do not significantly mitigate financial constraints, private credit bureaus are linked to higher financial access.
The role of information sharing bureaus in reducing information asymmetry on the one hand and borrower (and lender competition) on 'lending corruption' on the other hand, have been examined by Barth et al. (2009) to arrive at two main conclusions. First, lending-related corruption is reduced by interbank competition and reducing information asymmetry plays a fundamental role in the negative nexus. Second, 'corrupt lending' is also substantially affected by the legal environment, firm competition and the ownership structure of banks and firms.
Two main concerns related to information sharing and financial access have been investigated by Triki and Gajigo (2014) , notably: the impact of information sharing bureaus on access to finance by firms and the effect of the design of private credit registries on constraints in financial access. Their findings show that: (i) access to finance is comparatively higher in countries which have private credit bureaus, relative to those with public credit registries or no information sharing bureaus and (ii) considerable cross-country differences are apparent in financial access and the design of information sharing bureaus with public credit registries.
Information sharing policy thresholds in financial development have been investigated by Asongu et al. (2015) to establish conflicting findings related to the effects of information sharing bureaus on financial development dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. have examined the effects of information sharing bureaus throughout the conditional distributions of financial development to conclude that existing levels of financial development are important in the materialisation of incremental rewards from information sharing bureaus.
As articulated in the introduction, this study complements the existing literature by engaging the missing dimensions of financial sector development and introducing hitherto unexplored concepts of financial formalization, informalization and non-formalization.
Data and Methodology
Data
This paper The propositions in Table 1 
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Five control variables are used in order to account for variable omission bias, namely:
foreign aid, public investment, trade, GDP growth and inflation. This choice of these variables is in accordance with the financial development literature (Huang, 2005; Osabuohein & Efobi, 2013; Asongu, 2014b) . After a pilot investigation, it is apparent that accounting for more than five control variables leads to the proliferation of instruments: the number of cross-sections is lower than the corresponding number of instruments in the Generalised Method of Moments specifications.
With regards to the expected signs, from a theoretical standpoint, development assistance is expected to increase financial development because it is anticipated to bridge the savinginvestment gap in less developed countries (Easterly, 2005) . From a practical angle however, the underlying effect of foreign aid depends on the amount of aid that actually reaches the destination or recipient country. While a substantial bulk of the aid may be spent in donor countries, corrupt officials in recipient countries may siphon some and redeposit in tax havens that are under the jurisdictions of donor countries. The positive relationship between economic growth and financial development has been substantially documented in the literature (see Jaffee & Levonian 2001; Levine, 1997; Saint-Paul, 1992; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1992) . In essence, economic growth is linked to financial intermediation because of more interbank competition and increased availability of resources for productive investments. There is a positive relationship between investment and financial development (see Huang, 2011) . Both theoretical (Huybens & Smith, 1999) and empirical (Boyd et al., 2001) literature are consistent with the perspective that chaotic inflation is linked to less active and inefficient financial institutions. Huang and Temple (2005) and Do and Levchenko (2004) 
Methodology
Baseline specification
The Ordinary Least Squares specification is as follows in Eq. (1)  the error term. The specification is robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
3.2.2Robustness Specification
The study adopts the Generalised Method of Moments with forward orthogonal deviations as empirical strategy for robustness check. The specification is the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) which has been documented to limit instrument proliferation and control for cross sectional dependence (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008) . The two primary conditions for the implementation of the Generalised Method of Moments technique are satisfied because: (i) the financial sector development dependent variables are persistent, given that their correlations with corresponding lags are higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 (see Appendix 5) and (ii) the number of time series (T=8) is less than the number of cross sections (N=53). Hence, N>T.
The following equations in levels (2) and first difference (3) summarize the estimation procedure.  the error term. In the specification, a two-step instead of a one-step procedure is adopted because it controls for heteroscedasticity. In accordance with Brambor et al. (2006) on the pitfalls in interactive regressions: (i) all constitutive terms are included in the specifications and (ii) the effect of the modifying variables (or information sharing bureaus) is interpreted as a conditional marginal effect.
Identification and exclusion restrictions
In accordance with recent literature (Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & De Moor, 2016) , all independent indicators are predetermined or suspected endogenous variables. Hence, while the gmmstyle is adopted for the predetermined variables, only years are treated as strictly exogenous and the method for treating the ivstyle (years) is 'iv(years, eq(diff))' because it is highly unfeasible for the years to become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b) .
In order to address the issue of simultaneity, lagged regressors are used as instruments for forward-differenced indicators. In essence, in order to remove fixed effects that are susceptible of influencing the assessed relationships, Helmet transformations are performed for the regressors (see Asongu & De Moor, 2016) . These transformations embody forward meandifferencing of the indicators: the mean of future observations is subtracted from the variables instead of subtracting the previous observations for the contemporaneous one (Roodman, 2009b, p. 104) . These transformations ensure parallel or orthogonal conditions between forwarddifferenced variables and lagged values. Irrespective of the number of lags, in order to minimise the loss of data, with the exception of the last observation for each country, the underlying transformations are computable for all observations. "And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments" (Roodman (2009b, p. 104) .
The study further argues that the years (also used as instruments) that are treated as strictly exogenous, influence the outcome indicator only through the endogenous explaining variables. The statistical relevance underlying this exclusion restriction is investigated with the Difference in Hansen Test for instrument exogeneity. Accordingly, the alternative hypothesis of the test should be rejected for the instruments to elucidate the dependent variable exclusively via the endogenous explaining variables.
It is important to note that in a standard instrumental variable procedure, rejecting the alternative hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions test reveals that the instruments explain the outcome variable exclusively through investigated channels or explaining variables.
Whereas this information criterion has been employed in the literature using an instrumental variable estimation technique (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016) , in the Table 2 presents findings related to formal financial development, the results of informal (Panel A) and non-formal (Panel B) financial development are presented in Table 3 . The findings are discussed in two levels, notably: (i) effects without interactions and (ii) impacts with interactions where marginal and unconditional effects are discussed. For instance, in the second-to-the last column of 
Empirical results
Baseline results with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
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The following findings are established from the baseline findings. Both information sharing bureaus increase (reduce) formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development and increasing public credit registries leads to negative (positive) net effects on formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development. The control variables are significant with the expected signs. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. ISB: Information Sharing Bureaus. Dev: Development. na: net effects cannot be computed because of the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effects. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. ISB: Information Sharing Bureaus. Dev: Development. na: net effects cannot be computed because of the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effects.
2 Robustness checks with Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)
From Table 5 on nexuses between financial informalization and information sharing, the following findings are apparent. First, non valid inferences can be derived from the right-handside because at the 1% significance level, there is post-estimation presence of autocorrelation in the residuals. Second, public credit registries have a negative impact on informal financial development. Third, the net effect of private credit bureaus is positive, albeit with negative marginal effects and positive unconditional impacts. Fourth, on the control variables, the negative signs of GDP growth and public investment are consistent with intuition. Public investment is channelled through formal banking institutions for the most part. The two decades of growth resurgence in Africa have been characterised by exclusive development. This is the reason an April 2015 World Bank report has revealed that from the 1990s poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa (World Bank, 2015) . The findings of Table 6 on non-formal financial development are broadly consistent with those of Table 5 with the exception that the unconditional positive effect of private credit bureaus is not significant 14 .
Further discussion and policy implications
Comparing and contrasting the findings from Ordinary Least Squares and Generalised
Method of Moments yields the following conclusions. Information sharing bureaus increase (reduce) formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development and increasing information sharing offices leads to negative(positive) net effects on formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development. Whereas the first strand of the findings is broadly consistent with theoretical underpinnings and intuition for introducing information sharing offices, the second strand on decreasing marginal effects is an indication that increasing information sharing offices beyond a specific threshold leads to undesired effects or impacts that are not consistent with theoretical underpinnings. In the paragraphs that follow, we first discuss implications for the first strand of the findings, then implications for the second strand.
In the first strand, findings from non-interactive specifications are consistent with theoretical underpinnings because, information sharing bureaus are primarily designed to increase financial access in the formal financial sector and discourage financial access in the informal/non-formal financial sectors. From the formal financial development perspective, information sharing bureaus reduce information asymmetry notably: by mitigating adverse selection on the part of lenders and moral hazard on the part of borrowers. From the informal financial development angle, information sharing bureaus also act as disciplining devices by discouraging borrowers from defaulting on their debts because they think they can rely on the informal and non-formal financial sectors as viable and sustainable alternatives to the formal financial sector.
In the second strand of the findings, we have observed that increasing information sharing office leads to undesired effects. In other words, we have broadly established that: (i) in
Ordinary Least Squares, increasing public credit registries leads to negative (positive) net effects on formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development and (ii) in Generalised Methods of Moments, increasing public credit registries leads to negative net effects on formal financial development while increasing private credit bureaus leads to positive net impacts on informal financial development. It follows that increasing information sharing offices beyond certain levels lead to counterintuitive findings. We determine policy thresholds at which such counterintuitive results can be avoided. This is done at three-stages, namely: clarification of the notion of threshold, calculation of thresholds and threshold implications.
The notion of threshold is in accordance with Cummins (2000) on a certain level in language proficiency before second-language speakers can begin enjoying the advantages from a given language. In addition, the conception of threshold is also consistent with the theory of critical mass that has been considerably documented in the economic development literature (see Roller & Waverman, 2001; Ashraf & Galor, 2013) . A very recent application of the threshold or critical mass theory from interaction empirical specifications can be found in Batuo (2015) . In essence, in this narrative, the notion of threshold is not different from: (i) critical mass for positive impacts (Roller & Waverman, 2001; Batuo, 2015) ; (ii) minimum requirement for enjoying of positive impacts (Cummins, 2000) and (iii) conditions for Kuznets and U shapes (Ashraf & Galor, 2013) .
In the light of the above discussion, a negative (positive) threshold of an information sharing bureau is the level of the information sharing bureau at which an initial or unconditional positive (negative) effect becomes negative (positive). Two scenarios are apparent from our findings. On the one hand, on informal/non-formal financial development, a negative threshold is the point at which the positive effect of an information sharing bureaus on informal/non-formal financial development becomes negative. On the other hand, on formal financial development, a positive threshold is the point at which the negative effect of an information sharing bureau on formal financial development changes from negative to positive. Hence, these are thresholds of information sharing offices for which the desired effects of increasing (reducing) formal (informal/non-formal) financial development can be achieved. Moreover, for the computed thresholds to make economic sense or have economic meaning, they should be within the minimum and maximum ranges disclosed by the summary statistics.
From the baseline findings: (i) the positive threshold of public credit registries in financial development formalization is 50 (0.005/0.0001) percent coverage ( Biekpe, 2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012; Asongu, 2012 Asongu, , 2013 .
Conclusion and future research directions
This study has investigated the effect information sharing has on financial sector development in By introducing the concept of financial sector development, the study has united two streams of research by simultaneously contributing to the macroeconomic literature on the measurement of financial development and responding to an evolving field of economic development through informal finance and microfinance. Furthermore, the study has suggested a practical means of disentangling the impact of information sharing on various financial sectors.
The findings can be extended by assessing the established linkages throughout the conditional distribution of financial sector development. The intuition for this future research direction is that the role of information sharing on financial sector development may be contingent on the level of financial sector development, such that differing impacts are apparent in countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial sector development. 
Appendices
